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APPEARANCE AND GROOMING STANDARDS AS
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
Allison T. Steinle'
"It is amazing how complete is the delusion that beauty is good-
ness."'
Since the inception of Title VII's prohibition against employment dis-
crimination on the basis of sex,2 women have made remarkable progress
in their effort to shatter the ubiquitous glass ceiling3 and achieve parity
+ J.D. Candidate, 2007, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; A.B., 2004, The University of Michigan. The author would like to thank Professor
Jeffrey W. Larroca for his invaluable guidance throughout the writing process and Peggy
M. O'Neil for her excellent editing and advice. She also thanks her family and friends for
their unending love, support, and patience.
1. LEO TOLSTOY, The Kreutzer Sonata, in THE KREUTZER SONATA AND OTHER
STORIEs 85, 100 (Richard F. Gustafson ed., Louise Shanks Maude et al. trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1998) (1889).
2. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(2000). Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual .. . with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.., or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. Although the National Women's Party had lobbied Congress for an equal rights
amendment since the 1920s, many believe that sex was included as a protected class along-
side the more pressing concerns of race, color, and religion in a botched attempt by a
Southern conservative to derail the Act. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of Title VII: Expanding the Reach-Making
Title VII Work for Women and National Origin Minorities (June 23, 2004),
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/40th/panel/expanding.html. The proposal to equate sex
and race was met with alarm not only by civil rights opponents, but also by many promi-
nent feminists, including Deputy Secretary of Labor Esther Peterson, who argued that
"separate treatment [was] preferable," and "equal treatment would undermine the few
gains women had made." Id. Ironically, however, Peterson's active support of the Equal
Pay Act of 1963 two years earlier is credited with convincing Congress that the inclusion of
sex was needed. Id. Despite the tenuous origins of sex as a protected class, nearly one-
third of Title VII complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in 1965 were based on sex. Id.
3. See M. Neil Browne & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Many Paths to Justice: The
Glass Ceiling, the Looking Glass, and Strategies for Getting to the Other Side, 21 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 61, 63-64 (2003) (defining the metaphorical "glass ceiling" as a hidden
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with their male counterparts in the workplace.4 In forty years, Title VII
not only has successfully forged legal protections for women in traditional
employment practices such as hiring, firing, and promotion,5 but also has
been read broadly to prohibit sexual harassment6 and the unwelcome
imposition of sex stereotypes on employees.7 Nevertheless, a stubborn
truism continues to hinder gender equality in the workplace, safely evad-
ing Title VII's protections: sex sells.9
The commercial appeal of "cool, yet seductive" teenage sales associ-
ates,' o "hot" women at cosmetics and lingerie counters," and waitresses
barrier to women's advancement up the corporate ladder, created by unwitting male per-
ceptions that their failure to promote women is justifiable).
4. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE
LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 1 (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-
2005.pdf. The percentage of women participating in the workforce steadily rose from 43%
in 1970 to 60% in 2004, and the pay disparity between the sexes steadily narrowed, from
62% of men's earnings in 1970 to 80% in 2004. Id.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
6. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986) (reading Title VII's
coverage to include "hostile environment" sexual harassment regardless of whether or not
it constitutes an "economic quid pro quo" that is tangibly linked to a condition of employ-
ment).
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED
AGAINST WOMEN 20-21 (1991) ("[I]deas about 'beauty' have evolved since the Industrial
Revolution side by side with ideas about money, so that the two are virtual parallels in our
consumer economy .... Beauty [is] no longer just a symbolic form of currency; it [has]
literally bec[o]me money."); see, e.g., Gregory J. Kamer & Edwin A. Keller, Jr., Give Me
$5 Chips, a Jack and Coke-Hold the Cleavage: A Look at Employee Appearance Issues in
the Gaming Industry, 7 GAMING L. REV. 335, 345 (2003) (observing that the retail enter-
tainment industry has fully adopted the adage that "sex sells," despite the fact that the
industry remains in the primary business of selling "rooms, restaurants, and gaming,"
rather than sexual titillation).
10. See Karen Zakrzewski, Comment, The Prevalence of "Look"ism in Hiring Deci-
sions: How Federal Law Should Be Amended to Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the
Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 431, 431-32 (2005) (describing a recently challenged
hiring standard utilized by the popular clothing store Abercrombie & Fitch). Abercrombie
& Fitch's "all-American" clothing targets seven to fourteen year olds with merchandise
including miniskirts (affectionately referred to as "belts" by teenage girls, "because they're
so short they might as well be") and thong underwear reading "WINK WINK" and "EYE
CANDY." ARIEL LEVY, FEMALE CHAUVINIST PIGS: WOMEN AND THE RISE OF
RAUNCH CULTURE 142-43 (2005). See infra note 29, for a discussion of the EEOC's chal-
lenge to Abercrombie & Fitch's hiring practices.
11. See Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1127-28 (Cal. 2005) (involving
the state sex discrimination claim of a female sales manager who was ordered by a male
executive to fire a dark-skinned female sales associate and replace her with "'somebody
hot .... a young attractive blonde girl, very sexy"'); see also Shoppe v. Gucci Am., Inc., 14
P.3d 1049, 1054, 1068 (Haw. 2000) (involving the age discrimination and tort claims of a
store manager who was told by a district manager to wear more makeup and alter her
clothing and hair to reflect Gucci's "much younger look").
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who resemble "scantily clad Barbie doll[s]"' 2 is clear. 3 To survive in a
competitive marketplace, employers understandably seek to tap into to-
day's "lookist" culture 4 by ensuring their employees create a salable im-
age." Often, this is achieved through hiring on the basis of personal at-
tractiveness or requiring adherence to strict dress codes or grooming
standards.1
6
This "lookism" creates gross inequities in the workplace, including dis-
crimination against those viewed as unattractive or overweight. 7 It also
12. See Kamer & Keller, supra note 9, at 335 (describing the efforts by managers to
inundate casinos with "sex appeal and gregarious personalities"); see, e.g., Alam v. Reno
Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 908 (D. Nev. 1993) (involving a Title VII challenge to the
casino's practice of hiring "young [sexually attractive] 'barbie doll' type women").
13. See WOLF, supra note 9, at 27-28.
14. See Zakrzewski, supra note 10, at 432-33; Stephanie Armour, Your Appearance,
Good or Bad, Can Affect Size of Your Paycheck, USA TODAY, July 20, 2005, at 1B; Mi-
chael Starr & Adam J. Heft, Appearance Bias, NAT'L L.J., June 20, 2005, at 16; Martin
Wolk, Better Wealthy than Handsome? Why Not Both?: Good Looks Translate into Higher
Pay, Study Finds, MSNBC, Apr. 7, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7420983. Psycho-
logical and economic studies reveal that looks play an actual role in how people are evalu-
ated at work. A study by Professor Daniel Hamermesh found that male attorneys who
received "above-average beauty" ratings while in law school earned on average up to
twelve percent more than those rated as "below-average." Wolk, supra. Another study by
Professor Dalton Conley found that female workers' increased body mass resulted in lower
family income and decreased job prestige. Armour, supra.
15. See Stacey S. Baron, Note, (Un)Lawfully Beautiful: The Legal (De) Construction
of Beauty, 46 B.C. L. REV. 359, 365 (2005). Baron cites to Harvard economist Robert
Barro's highly-circulated and controversial article So You Want to Hire the Beautiful. Well,
Why Not?, which argues that "[a] worker's physical appearance, to the extent that it is
valued by customers and co-workers, is as legitimate a job qualification as intelligence,
dexterity, job experience, and personality." Id. at 366; Robert J. Barro, So You Want to
Hire the Beautiful. Well, Why Not?, Bus. WK., Mar. 16, 1998, at 18.
16. See Baron, supra note 15, at 365; Kamer & Keller, supra note 9, at 335.
17. See generally Kari Homer, Comment, A Growing Problem: Why the Federal Gov-
ernment Needs to Shoulder the Burden in Protecting Workers from Weight Discrimination,
54 CATH. U. L. REV. 589, 589-93 (2005) (discussing obesity discrimination); Note, Facial
Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of
Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035-42 (1987) (discussing the history of
"ugly laws" and other discriminatory acts against facially deformed persons). Neither
facial appearance nor weight is explicitly protected under federal law. See Zakrzewski,
supra note 10, at 444. While a select number of state and local laws do prohibit employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of personal appearance, they generally contain broadly
worded exceptions for dress codes and personal hygiene concerns. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 12947.5, 12949 (West 2005) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender
identity and requiring employers to allow their employees to wear pants, but excepting
uniforms, costumes, and all "reasonable workplace appearance, grooming, and dress stan-
dards ... provided that an employer shall allow an employee to appear or dress consis-
tently with the employee's gender identity"); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1401.02(22), 2-
1402.11(a) (2001) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "personal appearance," but
excepting all requirements or uniforms applied to a class of employees for "a reasonable
business purpose"); MICH. COMP. LAws § 37.2102 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of height and weight, but not addressing mutable appearance); SANTA CRUZ,
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imposes greater burdens on women.' 8 An onslaught of Title VII sex dis-
crimination challenges to appearance-related employment decisions and
policies have hit the courts in recent years.19 Potential defendants run the
cultural and socioeconomic gamut, from the Hooters restaurant chain" to
legal employers.2' Casinos, clubs, bars, and other entertainment venues-
where the lines between sex and service often blur- are particularly vul-
nerable to discrimination claims. 2
For example, in 2000, Harrah's Casinos enacted the "Personal Best"
program in an effort to upgrade its image. 3 Harrah's required all bever-
CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.83.010, 9.83.020(13) (1992) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of "height, weight or physical characteristic," but not addressing mutable appearance).
18. See infra Part II. Appearance-related policies may also discriminate against other
protected classes under Title VII. For examples of how appearance and grooming stan-
dards affect a specific race, see Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1113-14 (11th
Cir. 1993), which involved African-American firefighters' challenge to a departmental no-
beard policy that had a disparate impact on African-Americans, who are predisposed to
pseudo-folliculitis barbae, a bacterial infection that occurs after shaving, and Eatman v.
United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), which involved a challenge
by an African-American employee to a policy prohibiting dreadlocks and other unconven-
tional hairstyles. For examples of how appearance and grooming standards may affect a
specific religion, see Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 128-30 (1st Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2940 (2005), which involved a challenge to Costco's prohibi-
tion against facial piercings by a member of the Church of Body Modification, and Carter
v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 673, 673-75 (E.D. Ark. 1993), supp. opinion at 849 F.
Supp. 677 (E.D. Ark. 1993), which involved a challenge to the company's no-beard policy
by a Jewish employee.
19. See Tresa Baldas, Workplace Appearance Is More than Skin Deep, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 11, 2005, at 5.
20. See Kenneth L. Schneyer, Hooting: Public and Popular Discourse about Sex Dis-
crimination, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551, 565-68 (1998) (tracing the line of challenges
brought against the Hooters restaurant chain in the late 1990s related to its exclusive use of
female servers, and sexual harassment claims brought by the provocatively uniformed
"Hooters girls," which in turn triggered public and political outcry in support of the restau-
rant).
21. See Shannon P. Duffy, Pantsuits Coming Out of the Closet? Philadelphia DA
Tosses Skirts-Only Policy, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 1, 2003, http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1069801652231. Following employee complaints and recruiting difficulties,
Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne Abraham chose to revoke her controversial no-pants
policy for female attorneys in 2003. Id. The policy was largely predicated on the belief
that judges and juries viewed pantsuits in the courtroom as "scandalous." Id. In contrast
to employers who seek to capitalize on employee sexuality, conservative workplaces may
enforce gender-specific appearance standards in order to keep female sexuality in check.
See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1376-77 (7th Cir. 1987) (involving the
termination of a female teacher largely for her failure to reflect the conservative "Brooks
Brothers look" a state juvenile detention facility had required for its employees); Tardif v.
Quinn, 545 F.2d 761, 762-63 (1st Cir. 1976) (involving the termination of a young public
high school teacher for wearing mid-thigh length skirts).
22. See Kamer & Keller, supra note 9, at 335.
23. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen I), 392 F.3d 1076, 1077-78 (9th Cir.
2004), affd on reh'g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006); see also David B. Cruz, Making
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age service employees to adhere to a meticulous appearance code: men
and women were to be "well groomed, appealing to the eye, [and] firm
and body toned"; men were to maintain short haircuts, trimmed nails,
and clean faces; and women were to wear "teased, curled, or styled" hair,
stockings, high heels, and makeup.4 Darlene Jespersen, a twenty-year
veteran bartender and guest favorite at Harrah's Reno, complained that
the cosmetics made her feel "sick, degraded, exposed, and violated" and
interfered with her ability to firmly manage unruly customers.2 Harrah's
Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 241 (2004) (tracing the
history of Harrah's image and appearance policies).
24. See Jespersen I, 392 F.3d at 1077. The relevant portion of the "Personal Best"
policy reads in full:
All Beverage Service Personnel .... must be well groomed, appealing to the eye, be
firm and body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the
specified uniform. Additional factors to be considered include, but are not limited to,
hair styles, overall body contour, and degree of comfort the employee projects while
wearing the uniform....
Overall Guidelines (applied equally to male/female):
* Appearance: Must maintain Personal Best image portrayed at time of hire.
* Jewelry, if issued, must be worn. Otherwise, tasteful and simple jewelry is per-
mitted; no large chokers, chains or bracelets.
0 No faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors are permitted.
Males:
* Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited.
" Hands and fingernails must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times. No
colored polish is permitted.
• Eye and facial makeup is not permitted.
" Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type dress style.
Females:
* Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn
down at all times, no exceptions.
0 Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee's skin
tone. No runs.
0 Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or
length.
0 Make up (face powder, blush, and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in
complementary colors. Lip color must be worn at all times.
0 Shoes will be basic black pumps with 1-inch minimum heel height and closed
heel and toe.
Harrah's Casinos Beverage Service Personnel Appearance and Grooming Guidelines and
Position Descriptions (copy on file with author). Employees were trained by a profes-
sional image consultant, tested on their image "proficiency," had photographs placed in
their personnel file to be used as "appearance measurement tools," and signed "Personal
Best" contracts. Id.
25. See Jespersen 1, 392 F.3d at 1077; Cruz, supra note 23, at 242. Jespersen's deposi-
tion is particularly telling:
Q. And after [the image consultant] applied makeup on half your face and left the
other half normal, did there come a time when you looked in the mirror?
A. Yes.
Q. And tell me your reaction.
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eventually fired Jespersen for her refusal to conform to the program.6
Jespersen brought suit against Harrah's, alleging sex discrimination. 2
Although many employers compromise or settle out of court29 when
unhappy employees challenge their appearance policies, some employers
also have successfully defended their practices in court.30 Such was the
unfortunate result for Jespersen.31 The United States District Court for
the District of Nevada granted summary judgment for Harrah's,3 2 and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.33
A. I felt very degraded and very demeaning [sic]. I actually felt sick that I had to
cover up my face and become pretty or feminine ... to keep my job or to do my job. I
actually felt ill and I felt violated.
Q. Did you attempt thereafter to actually wear makeup... ?
A. Yes.... Just [for] a couple weeks.
Q. What was that experience like?
A. It was-I felt that it-it prohibited me from doing my job. I felt exposed. I actu-
ally felt like I was naked. I mean, I-I felt that I-that I was being pushed into having
to be revealed or forced to be feminine to do that job, to stay employed, when it has
nothing to do with the making of a drink. I felt that I had become dolled up and that I
was a sexual object.
.It affected my self-dignity. It portrayed me in a role that I wasn't comfortable,
that I wasn't taken seriously as myself.
I also fe[lt] that it took away my credibility as an individual and as a person. I was-
it was demanded that-that my job performance was based on how I look and not on
how I did my work.
Deposition of Darlene Betty Jespersen at 138-39, Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 280
F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002) (No. CV-N-01-0401-ECR-VPC) (May 22, 2002) (copy on
file with author).
26. See Jespersen I, 392 F.3d at 1078.
27. See id. See generally Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Jespersen v.
Harrah's Casino, http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/cases/record?record=19 (last
visited Sept. 22, 2006) (posting select motions, briefs, and exhibits related to the case).
28. See Kamer & Keller, supra note 9, at 346. Kamer and Keller, both experienced
labor and employment attorneys in Las Vegas, advise their clients to carefully investigate
every employee complaint that may arise out of an appearance policy and "be flexible
enough to make reasonable accommodations." Id.
29. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC
Agrees to Landmark Resolution of Discrimination Case Against Abercrombie & Fitch
(Nov. 16, 2004), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/11-18-04.html (announcing a fifty
million dollar consent decree arising out of class action allegations that the store systemati-
cally discriminated against female and minority employees by "adopting a restrictive mar-
keting image" in violation of Title VII); see also Zakrzewski, supra note 10, at 432, 458
(providing a description of the Abercrombie & Fitch look).
30. See, e.g., infra Part II.
31. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
32. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1195 (D. Nev.
2002), affd, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), affd on reh'g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.
2006).
33. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen II), 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc); Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen 1), 392 F.3d 1076,
1083 (9th Cir. 2004), affd on reh'g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Courts rarely interfere with employers' business judgments to impose
gender-differentiated appearance and grooming standards on their em-
ployees unless these standards bear a clear and unequivocal relationship
to a protected class.34 Absent evidence that a policy places a calculable
unequal burden on one gender over the other, Title VII is unlikely to
provide a remedy for parties who believe they have been treated ad-
versely "because of ... sex.,
35
At the same time, however, Title VII jurisprudence speaks loudly
against the attitudes that appearance policies such as Harrah's' embody.
Courts have long rejected sex and sex appeal as legitimate business ne-
cessities subject to the "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ)
exception to Title VII.37 More importantly, the Supreme Court has held
the use of sex stereotyping in the workplace to be a violation of Title
VII. 8 Surprisingly, however, the Supreme Court has never heard a Title
VII case involving a gender-differentiated dress or appearance code. 9
By siding with employers in favor of judicial and economic efficiency, 4
courts deprive Title VII of its teeth at a time when sex discrimination is
34. See infra Part II.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); infra note 125 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Part I.
37. See infra Part I.A.
38. See infra Part I.C.
39. Cruz, supra note 23, at 243. In Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1976), the
Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to a gender-differentiated appearance
regulation for male police officers that prohibited beards and required trimmed hair, side-
burns, and mustaches. The Court held that such regulations did not deprive officers of a
liberty interest in their choice of personal appearance in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 249. However, the plaintiff did not raise and the Court did not address
any claims, constitutional or otherwise, related to the sex-specific nature of the regulations.
See id. at 240-41.
40. See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th Cir.
2003) (Posner, J., concurring):
[T]here is a difference.., between, on the one hand, using evidence of the plaintiffs
failure to wear nail polish (or, if the plaintiff is a man, his using nail polish) to show
that her sex played a role in the adverse employment action of which she complains,
and, on the other hand, creating a subtype of sexual discrimination called "sex stereo-
typing," as if there were a federally protected right for male workers to wear nail pol-
ish and dresses and speak in falsetto and mince about in high heels, or for female
ditchdiggers to strip to the waist in hot weather.
•.. To impute such a distinction to the authors of Title VII is to indulge in a most
extravagant legal fiction. It is also to saddle the courts with the making of distinctions
that are beyond the practical capacity of the litigation process .... To suppose courts
capable of disentangling the motives for disliking the nonstereotypical man or woman
is a fantasy.
See also Barro, supra note 15 (arguing that hindering employers from hiring on the basis of
physical appearance would greatly affect the national product).
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rarely overt or straightforward." This is particularly alarming in a sexu-
ally charged society where "more and more women embrace Botox and
implants and stretch and protrude to extreme proportions to satisfy male
desires[,] .... technology is biology, [and] all women can look like inflat-
able dolls., 42 As the image-conscious, "porn-chic" mentality permeates
society and hence the workplace, working women like Jespersen end up
on the receiving end of a particularly noxious form of sex stereotyping,
with only questionable protection from Title VII. 4
This Comment addresses the question of when an employer may per-
missibly impose a gender-specific appearance or grooming standard on
an employee in light of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination.
Part One turns to traditional Title VII analysis. Section A examines the
historic application of the BFOQ defense to gender-specific employment
decisions. Section B looks to the disparate treatment claim with appear-
ance and grooming standards in mind. Section C then examines the Su-
preme Court's landmark recognition of sex stereotyping in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins.
Using Price Waterhouse as a foundation, Part Two looks to the Ninth
Circuit's systematic exclusion of mutable appearance from Title VII's
coverage and its subsequent holding in Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating
41. See Audrey J. Lee, Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 481, 488 (2005) ("[U]nconscious discrimination is
the 'most pervasive and important form of bias' today as 'overt bigotry has waned in re-
sponse to antidiscrimination laws and evolving social mores."' (quoting Amy L. Wax, Dis-
crimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1130 (1999))).
42. Maureen Dowd, What's a Modern Girl to Do?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, § 6
(Magazine), at 50, 55; see also Naomi Wolf, The Porn Myth, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 20, 2003,
available at http://nymetro.com/nymetro/news/trends/n_9437/ (discussing the broader social
consequences of a society in which "starlets in tabloids boast of learning to strip from pro-
fessionals; the 'cool girls' go with guys to the strip clubs, and even ask for lap dances; [and]
college girls are expected to tease guys at keg parties with lesbian kisses A la Britney and
Madonna").
43. See Baldas, supra note 19 (pointing to escalating tensions between appearance
policies and the increasingly heterogeneous workforce); Wolf, supra note 42 (comparing
young women's sexual attitudes with those forty and over, and concluding that the genera-
tions are pitted against each other, with both ultimately harmed by the increasing objectifi-
cation of women). More recent casino appearance policies make the "Personal Best"
requirements look innocuous. In 2003, the Rio Casino in Las Vegas replaced all eighty of
its aging cocktail waitresses with young, attractive "Bevertainers" dressed in "bikinilike
outfits with string backs." Rod Smith, Rio to Replace Cocktail Servers, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Feb. 20, 2003, at lA. Also in 2003, the Borgata Casino in Atlantic City transformed its
cocktail waitresses into "Borgata babes." Judy DeHaven, Reflecting on Weighty Matters:
'Borgata Babes' Policy Attracts Rights Inquiry, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 26, 2005, at
13. According to Borgata's policies, waitresses are subject to beauty treatments, personal
trainers, "diet cops" at meal breaks, a weigh-in policy where they are given a ninety day
suspension and eventually fired if they gain more than seven percent of their initial body
weight, and are allegedly encouraged to have breast implants. Id.
44. See infra Part II.
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Co. that separate but equal appearance and grooming programs do not
discriminate against female employees. Part Three argues that the appli-
cation of Price Waterhouse to discrimination on the basis of mutable ap-
pearance is consistent with Title VII, precedent, and equitable considera-
tions of justice. In conclusion, this Comment posits a legal standard of
sex stereotyping that applies to both immutable and mutable sex dis-
crimination and calls for a judicial reevaluation of the existing distinction
between the two.
I. APPLYING TITLE VII TO GENDER-SPECIFIC EMPLOYER PREFERENCES
A. Sex and Sexuality as "Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications"
Title VII notably does not prohibit all discrimination on the basis of
sex.4 ' Rather, Congress created a "bona fide occupational qualification"
exception to the statute that applies to employers who find an otherwise
prohibited discriminatory action "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise." 6 An employer may,
for example, permissibly discriminate on the basis of sex when hiring for
47certain gender-sensitive positions such as midwife or personal caregiver.
This exception provides important protections for employers by permit-
ting them to conform to social norms, and for customers by protecting
privacy interests.48
Although the BFOQ exception's scant legislative history suggests that
Congress intended for it to have a relatively broad application,49 the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has taken the
opposite stance.50 The EEOC's "Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex" provide that labels and assumptions as to what constitute
"[m]en's jobs" and "[w]omen's jobs" do not function as BFOQs5 The
guidelines explicitly reject "stereotyped characterizations of the sexes" as
45. See generally Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explain-
ing Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 149 (2004).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). Race and color are not included under the BFOQ
exception. Id.; see also International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
200-01 (1991).
47. See Yuracko, supra note 45, at 156.
48. See id.; see also Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 & n.23, 302 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) (discussing the role of customer preference and sexual privacy in sex-based
BFOQs).
49. See Yuracko, supra note 45, at 154-55 (citing Interpretive Memorandum on Title
VII of H.R. 7152, 110 CONG. REC. 7212 (1964)). Sponsors of Title VII provided examples
of BFOQs that would have permitted employers to make broad presumptions regarding a
protected status's relation to a particular skill, including a restaurant hiring only French
chefs and a professional sports team hiring only male athletes. Id.
50. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
51. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2005).
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52
employer considerations warranting the BFOQ exception. According to
the EEOC, BFOQs must be "necessary for the purpose of authenticity or
genuineness" of a business.53
Courts have further narrowed the EEOC's interpretation,54 particularly
regarding sexual titillation.55 Although there have been no known Title
VII challenges to the occupations of legal prostitution or stripping,56 any
profession where "a particular body is needed and used physically for the
sexual gratification of another person" would arguably fall within the
BFOQ exception for gender specificity.57
The threshold case involving sex as a BFOQ for employment arose out
of the Playboy Clubs' hiring of female Bunnies in the 1970s. In a 1971
ruling, the New York State Division of Human Rights concluded that
"womanhood" was indeed a BFOQ for Playboy Bunnies under the New
York analog to Title VII.59  Analogizing Playboy waitressing jobs to
"part[s] in a theatrical production," the Appeals Board found that the
Bunnies' primary task was to provide sex appeal as opposed to simply
serving cocktails. 6° Thus, single-sex hiring was found to be reasonably
necessary to carry out the normal operations of the Playboy Clubs.61
Following this rationale, courts adopted a primary purpose analysis in
evaluating whether a "plus-sex" business62 can properly invoke a BFOQ
defense. 63 Unless sexuality is the primary purpose of a business, and thus
reasonably necessary to its daily operations, employers are barred from
using the BFOQ provision. 64 For example, in Guardian Capital Corp. v.
New York State Division of Human Rights,65 a New York appellate court
ruled that an employer's efforts to transform a hotel restaurant into a
cabaret-themed nightclub by hiring exclusively female servers and requir-
52. Id. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii).
53. Id. § 1604.2(a)(2).
54. See generally International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
200-01 (1991) (adopting the EEOC's narrow interpretation of the BFOQ provision and
holding that the exception only applies to "objective, verifiable requirements [that] con-
cern job-related skills and aptitudes").
55. See infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text.
56. See Yuracko, supra note 45, at 157.
57. Id.
58. See WOLF, supra note 9, at 32-33.
59. Guardian Capital Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937,
939-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (Reynolds, J., concurring) (quoting St. Cross v. Playboy Club
of N.Y., No. CSF 22618-70, App. No. 773 (N.Y. Div. of Human Rights Dec. 17, 1971)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Yuracko, supra note 45, at 158 (defining "plus-sex" businesses as those that
"seek to sell sexual arousal, generally through the provision of gaze objects, along with
some other nonsexual good or service").
63. Id. at 172.
64. Id.
65. 360 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
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ing them to wear "alluring costumes" did not warrant a BFOQ defense.6
Distinguishing the case from the Playboy Clubs ruling, the court warned
that the employer could not engage in discriminatory hiring practices
simply to offer customers sexual titillation alongside food.67
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.6' clarified the distinction between the
primary purpose of a business and an employer's efforts to promote that
business.69 Facing financial difficulty, Southwest launched the "'Love'
campaign" in the early 1970s.7 ° For nearly a decade, the airline hired ex-
clusively female ticket agents and flight attendants, outfitted them in hot
pants and go-go boots, and adopted an advertising campaign targeting
male business passengers."
Conceding it was discriminating against male applicants for customer-
oriented positions, Southwest argued that the policy was "crucial to the
airline's continued financial success" and thus a BFOQ reasonably neces-
sary to the operation of the business.72 The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas rejected this argument. 3 Finding as an
evidentiary matter that "love" was not the only factor in passenger
choice,74 the court went on to carefully differentiate Title VII's use of the
term "business necessity" from mere business convenience:
For purposes of BFOQ analysis ... the business "essence" in-
quiry focuses on the particular service provided and the job tasks
and functions involved, not the business goal. If an employer
could justify employment discrimination merely on the grounds
that it is necessary to make a profit, Title VII would be nullified
in short order.75
Applying the above standard, the court concluded that Southwest was
in the primary business of selling air transport rather than sexual titilla-
66. Id. at 938.
67. Id. at 939. But see id. at 940 (Reynolds, J., concurring) (questioning the difference
between cabaret girls and Playboy Bunnies).
68. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
69. See id. at 302-03.
70. Id. at 294. The campaign was the brainchild of the Bloom Agency, hired to de-
velop a marketing strategy for the failing airline. Id. The Bloom Agency concluded that
Southwest should "break away from the conservative image of other airlines and project to
the traveling public an airline personification of feminine youth and vitality." Id.
71. See id. at 294-95. In keeping with the "love" theme, Southwest flew passengers
out of Dallas's Love Field, served "love bites" and "love potions," and ticketed at the
"quickie machine" (an electronic ticketing system) for "instant gratification." Id. at 294 &
n.4. Not surprisingly, these tactics succeeded, making Southwest an overnight industry
leader while other airlines suffered significant losses. Id. at 295 n.6.
72. Id. at 293.
73. Id. at 304.
74. Id. at 295-96.
75. Id. at 302 n.25.
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76tion and therefore not entitled to a BFOQ exception. Wilson defini-
tively established that only "in jobs where sex or vicarious sexual recrea-
tion is the primary service provided ... [does a] job automatically call[]
for one sex exclusively."
77
Courts also have addressed BFOQs in relation to mutable gender-
specific uniform requirements.78 Many of these cases are sexual harass-
ment claims stemming from employers requiring female employees to
wear sexually suggestive attire in the interest of customer preference. 79
Courts consistently hold that dress and appearance codes that place em-
ployees at risk for sexual harassment create actionable claims under Title
VII.8° Consistent with holdings involving immutable sex discrimination,
76. Id. at 302-03. At the same time, however, the court foreshadowed a slippery slope
effect in challenges to "plus-sex" employment practices:
Rejecting a wider BFOQ for sex does not eliminate the commercial exploitation of
sex appeal. It only requires, consistent with the purposes of Title VII, that employers
exploit the attractiveness and allure of a sexually integrated workforce .... This case
has serious underpinnings, but it also has disquieting strains. These strains, and they
were only that, warn that in our quest for non-racist, non-sexist goals, the demand for
equal rights can be pushed to silly extremes.
Id. at 304-05.
77. Id. at 301. Unfettered by Wilson, some in the airline industry have continued to
follow the Southwest model. In 2003, Hooters branched out into Hooters Air, which pro-
vided flights from locations such as Gary, Indiana and Newark, New Jersey to the Baha-
mas, Las Vegas, and Myrtle Beach, advertising "a great experience that enlivens the senses
and puts the fun back in flying!" with "two Hooters Girls on every flight!" Advantages to
Flying Hooters Air, http://www.hootersair.com/about/advantages (last visited Sept. 23,
2006); Hooters Air Flight Schedules, http://www.hootersair.com/flight-schedules (last
visited Sept. 23, 2006). In an irreverent nod to its earlier campaign, Southwest recently
launched an advertisement campaign featuring pre-Wilson "love airlines" stewardesses
cheekily lamenting, "'the hot pants had to go."' MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE
LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAw 324 (5th ed. 2003).
78. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the plain
language of the BFOQ provision only excepts decisions to hire or employ, and does not
address terms or conditions of employment. See Cruz, supra note 23, at 244-45. However,
only one federal court has adopted such a narrow reading of the provision, with the re-
mainder reading the exception to mirror the central clause of Title VII. See id. (citing
Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (D. Del. 1971)).
79. See Yuracko, supra note 45, at 198 & n.190 (collecting cases); see also infra note
80.
80. See Marentette v. Mich. Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909,912 (E.D. Mich. 1980):
[Tjhere is a difference between reasonable employment decisions based on factors
such as grooming and dress, and unreasonable ones .... [T]he Court believes that
some form of dress code could violate and, thus, fall within the provisions of Title VII.
The Court believes that a sexually provocative dress code imposed as a condition of
employment which subjects persons to sexual harassment could well violate the true
spirit and the literal language of Title VII.
See also EEOC v. Newtown Inn Assocs., 647 F. Supp. 957,958-60 (E.D. Va. 1986) (uphold-
ing the EEOC's finding that female cocktail waitresses had a Title VII claim after being
required to dress in provocative clothing and participate in sexually-oriented theme nights
such as "Bikini Night," "P.J. Night," and "Whips and Chains Night"); Priest v. Rotary, 634
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the BFOQ defense rarely applies.8'
For example, in EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp.,82 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York held that requiring a
lobby attendant to wear a revealing "Bicentennial uniform," which elic-
ited unwelcome sexual comments and innuendoes, violated Title VII.83
The court held that suggestive dress clearly was not a BFOQ for lobby
guards; rather, the inviting uniform hindered the position's primary secu-
rity and safety functions. 4
B. McDonnell Douglas Disparate Treatment
If a BFOQ defense is unavailable, employees who allege that their em-
ployer acted with discriminatory intent or motive may bring a Title VII
disparate treatment claim. 85 In order to set out a prima facie case of dis-
parate treatment, an employee must satisfy the test the Supreme Court
articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.86 This requires proof
that the plaintiff: (1) is part of a protected class; (2) is qualified for the
position in question; (3) was subject to a materially adverse employment
action despite being so qualified; and (4) can provide the court with indi-
cia that the employer was acting with a discriminatory motive.87
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant may
present evidence that the adverse employment action was taken for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.&8 If the defendant meets this bur-
F. Supp. 571, 574, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding a cocktail waitress established a prima
facie case of Title VII discrimination by demonstrating that she was terminated for her
refusal to wear "'something low-cut and slinky"' at the request of the defendant supervi-
sor).
81. See Yuracko, supra note 45, at 198.
82. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), supp. opinion at 521 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
83. Id. at 602-05, 607-08.
84. Id. at 611.
85. ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 77, at 281-82; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
504 (8th ed. 2004). Alternatively, a disparate impact claim is appropriate when employees
feel a facially neutral employment practice has a discriminatory effect. ROTHSTEIN &
LIEBMAN, supra note 77, at 281-82; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 504; see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). Disparate impact claims are rare
because the approach requires plaintiffs to explicitly pinpoint the particular action that
caused the discriminatory effect, a task that is virtually impossible in "nuanced" employ-
ment situations. See Lee, supra note 41, at 491, 494. Because the appearance and groom-
ing standards at issue here are read within the framework of intentionally imposed sex
stereotypes, disparate impact analysis is outside the scope of this Comment. For a discus-
sion of how Title VII disparate impact claims and defenses may be applied to appearance-
based discrimination, see Zakrzewski, supra note 10, at 440-42.
86. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
87. See id.
88. Id.
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den, the plaintiff may rebut the employer's assertion with evidence that
the articulated reason is mere pretext hiding a truly discriminatory mo-
tive.' 9 The court then is charged with weighing the evidence to deter-
mine, as a matter of fact, whether the plaintiff has been subjected to dis-
crimination.9° Thus, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading
the finder of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
acted with a prohibited intent.91
Mixed motive cases occur when the plaintiff is only able to present evi-
dence that a discriminatory bias was one of multiple reasons for an ad-
verse employment action.92 Mixed motive cases are particularly salient
for employees alleging discrimination on the basis of an appearance or
grooming standard, as employers at least partially enforce standards for
nondiscriminatory reasons, including promoting business and establishing
uniformity. 93
Mixed motive cases present specific evidentiary problems.94  First,
mixed motive plaintiffs bear a higher burden of proof in establishing a
prima facie case.95 In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,96 the Supreme Court
clarified the evidentiary standard used in mixed motive cases.9 The
Court held that although direct evidence of a discriminatory motive is not
necessary to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must still prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that discriminatory bias was a motivating
factor in the employment practice. 98 Second, mixed motive defendants
may present a "same decision" defense if they can show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the adverse action would have still taken place
89. Id. at 804. Factors that the Court lists as indicative of pretext include: the pres-
ence of similarly situated comparators of a different protected class who have not experi-
enced the same treatment; past adverse treatment towards the plaintiff; retaliatory behav-
ior by the employer; and the employer's past and present equal employment policies and
practices. Id. at 804-05; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 514-15
(1993) (applying similar standards for revealing pretext).
90. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982) (holding that a determi-
nation as to whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding).
91. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
92. Sheila A. Skojec, Annotation, Effect of Mixed or Dual Motives in Actions Under
Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunities Subchapter) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
US.C.S. §§ 2000e et seq.), 83 A.L.R. FED. 268, 269 (2005).
93. See, e.g., Jordan D. Bello, Note, Attractiveness as Hiring Criteria: Savvy Business
Practice or Racial Discrimination?, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 483, 489-91 (2004) (apply-
ing a mixed motive analysis to Abercrombie & Fitch's appearance-based hiring practices).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 489-90.
96. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
97. See id. at 101.
98. Id. This language must often then be reconciled with lower court precedent stat-
ing that the discriminatory motive must have been a "determinative factor" in the chal-
lenged practice. See Skojec, supra note 92, at 271.
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absent the discriminatory motive.9 As such, McDonnell Douglas raises
significant challenges for employees who may be unable to conclusively
establish that a particular appearance or grooming standard is imposed
"because of... sex.
10°
C. Price Waterhouse Sex Stereotyping
In 1989, the Supreme Court substantially expanded the scope of Title
VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.' ' Specifically, the Court read the
statute as prohibiting employers from forcing their employees to conform
to gender stereotypes as a condition of employment.'9 By looking be-
yond the plain language of Title VII to the legislative intent of the phrase
"because of ... sex,"103 Price Waterhouse clashed with lower court rulings
allowing employers to exploit women for the purposes of commercializ-
ing sex, provided that it was done on an equal opportunity basis.l 4
The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, was a candidate for
partnership with the firm.'05 Of the eighty-eight candidates, Hopkins was
the only woman.' 6 Although she received excellent performance evalua-
tions and won praise for her "strong character, independence, and integ-
rity," her aggressive behavior was not always welcome.' 7 Both support-
ers and opponents of Hopkins' partnership bid noted that she was "some-
times overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impa-
tient with staff."' ' As a result, she was passed over in 1982 and was not
reconsidered the following year.' 9 Hopkins brought a Title VII suit al-
leging that Price Waterhouse denied her partnership bid because of her
110
sex.
At trial, Hopkins presented significant circumstantial evidence that her
gender played a role in Price Waterhouse's ultimate decision."' Hopkins
pointed out that the bulk of her negative evaluations had been framed in
gendered terms: she was described as "macho"; as "overcompensat[ing]
for being a woman"; told to "take 'a course at charm school"'; and criti-
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000); infra note 122 and accompanying text.
100. See supra Part I.B.
101. 490 U.S. 228,251 (1989).
102. See id. at 250-52.
103. Id. at 240-41 (emphasis omitted). For a thorough discussion of how Price Water-
house "eviscerated" a long line of federal case law applying a strictly physiological defini-
tion of the term "sex," see Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572-74 (6th Cir. 2004).
104. See, e.g., supra note 76 (noting how the Wilson court explicitly permitted the ex-
ploitation of a "sexually integrated workforce").
105. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231.
106. Id. at 233.
107. Id. at 233-35.
108. Id. at 235.
109. Id. at 233 n.1.
110. Id. at 232.
111. See id. at 235.
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cized for swearing."' One partner explicitly advised her to "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" to improve her chances of making
partner.' A social psychologist also testified that sex stereotyping ap-
peared to be a factor in the partnership selection process.1 The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that Price
Waterhouse, although permitted to consider interpersonal skills in the
selection process, had impermissibly relied on sex stereotypes to make its
assessment of Hopkins." The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit affirmed."
6
The Supreme Court agreed that sex stereotypes played an impermissi-
ble role in Hopkins' evaluation."7 In his plurality opinion,"' Justice
Brennan clarified the term "sex stereotyping" in relation to Title VII:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate em-
ployees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group, for "'[in forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress in-
tended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."' An employer
who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions re-
quire this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job
if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.... The
plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her gen-
der in making its decision [and] stereotyped remarks can cer-




115. Id. at 236-37.
116. Id. at 237.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 258-61 (White, J., concurring); id. at 261-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor advocated a stricter burden of proof that required mixed motive plain-
tiffs to prove "by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in
the decision." Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Applying this standard, Justice
O'Connor joined the plurality in concluding that Hopkins proved she was impermissibly
terminated based on her failure to conform to sex stereotypes. Id. at 272. After Title VII
was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, to reflect
the plurality's analysis in Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor agreed that Title VII does
not require mixed motive plaintiffs to present direct evidence of sex discrimination. See
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,102 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (second alteration in original) (citations omit-
ted).
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Although the Supreme Court has since addressed sex stereotyping in
120
other contexts, it has yet to clarify the standard of proof necessary for
plaintiffs to establish that sex stereotyping played a "motivating part in
an employment decision., 12' Lower courts must rely on the specific facts
of Price Waterhouse and the Court's vague language in determining how
far the Price Waterhouse decision extends, and in what contexts it ap-
plies.' 22
II. APPLYING TITLE VII TO APPEARANCE AND GROOMING
STANDARDS: THE UNEQUAL BURDENS TEST AND THE LINE BETWEEN
IMMUTABLE STATUS AND MUTABLE APPEARANCE
Although Title VII has been successfully applied to employment deci-
sions that tangentially involve appearance and grooming, these cases are
the exception rather than the rule.23 In pure Title VII challenges to gen-
der-differentiated dress codes, appearance is considered independent of
sex unless plaintiffs can otherwise prove McDonnell Douglas disparate
treatment. In other words, members of one sex must establish that they
120. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736-37 (2003) (addressing
sex stereotyping in relation to the Family and Medical Leave Act's child-care provisions);
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998) (addressing sex
stereotyping in the same-sex sexual harassment context).
121. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 254-55. The opinion clarified that "once a plain-
tiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a motivating part in an employment deci-
sion, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role." Id. at 244-
45. However, it did not elaborate on how plaintiffs could establish that sex stereotypes
were motivating factors in the employment action. See id. at 258. In fact, Justice Brennan
expressly declined to establish such standards. Id. at 252; see also Gregory G. Sarno, Arti-
cle, Employer's Discriminatory Appearance Code, 33 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 71,
88-90 (1983) (providing case illustrations to demonstrate the differing factors courts use in
determining whether an employment action is predicated on an offensive stereotype).
122. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REv. 741, 759 (2005) (arguing that the Price Waterhouse "mixed motive claim...
was, at best, a mixed blessing for plaintiffs" because, although it gave them the ability to
bring a sex stereotyping claim, it also provided courts and employers with a virtually im-
penetrable "same decision" defense). Congress attempted to resolve the potential effects
of this circular reasoning when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id. First, Title VII
now confirms that plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case by "demonstrat[ing] that...
sex ... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000); Hart, supra, at 759-60.
Second, and more importantly, the Act codified the affirmative "same decision" defense in
such a way that it limits damages, but not liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Hart,
supra, at 760.
123. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Stan-
dards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2541, 2580 (1994)
(noting that courts have treated appearance and grooming standards as legally insignifi-
cant).
124. Sarno, supra note 121, at 88-90.
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have been treated differently from comparators of the opposite sex by
being saddled with calculable unequal burdens in conforming to an em-
ployer's standards'
The origins of the judicial distinction between appearance discrimina-
tion and sex discrimination are rooted in the culture wars of the 1960s
and 1970s.26 Courts consistently rejected young men's attempts to use
the newly established Title VII gender discrimination claim to maintain
their longer hairstyles.2 7 The Ninth Circuit, for example, concluded in
Baker v. California Land Title Co.'28 that differentiating hair length re-
quirements for men were inconsequential burdens and not based on sex
within the meaning of Title VII. 2 9 Courts reached the same conclusion in
challenges to necktie and no-beard policies for men and no-pants policies
for women.131
Initially, some employers argued that Baker placed all appearance and
grooming standards "outside the purview of Title VII," regardless of
their effects on a particular sex.131 Although this broad interpretation was
rejected in Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc.1 12 and replaced with the
unequal burdens test,133 courts have differed in how they weigh the bur-
dens imposed by gender-differentiated appearance and grooming re-
quirements.
125. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing and
applying the unequal burdens test to United Airlines' gender-differentiated weight stan-
dards for flight attendants).
126. See O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 265-
66 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (categorizing the "hair length/grooming" line of cases as rooted in a
battle over "accepted social norms"); Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Em-
ployee Appearance, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1395, 1417-18 (1992).
127. See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); Knott v. Mo.
Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507
F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896-97 (9th
Cir. 1974); Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
128. 507 F.2d 895.
129. Id. at 896-97 ("It seems clear from a reading of the Act that Congress was not
prompted to add 'sex' to Title VII on account of regulations by employers of dress or cos-
metic or grooming practices which an employer might think his particular business re-
quired.").
130. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (neck-
ties); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1391-92 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (skirts);
Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (S.D. Fla. 1972)
(beards).
131. See Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1982).
132. Id. at 606.
133. Id.
134. Compare infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (demonstrating how some
pre-Price Waterhouse courts viewed sex stereotypes as burdens under the equal burdens
test), with infra notes 138-62 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the Ninth Circuit
recently applied a facial "objective impediment" version of the unequal burdens test).
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Well before the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue of sex stereo-
typing, some lower courts incorporated the "demeaning" effects of gen-
der-differentiated uniforms into the unequal burdens analysis.' For ex-
ample, the Seventh Circuit endorsed the notion that gender-
differentiated uniforms predicated on the belief that female employees
were unable to dress as professionally as men violated Title VII, and
were not simply reflections of "accepted social [appearance and groom-
ing] norms.', 6 Also, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio held that uniforms rooted in harmful sex stereotypes
were tangible conditions of employment based on sex.137
Recent decisions have not been as generous in applying the unequal
burdens test, despite the Supreme Court's formal recognition of sex
stereotyping in 1989.118 In Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 39 the Ninth Cir-
cuit addressed United Airlines' gender-specific weight standards for
flight attendants that translated into medium-build maximums for women
135. See, e.g., infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
136. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979). In
Carroll, which was decided a decade before Price Waterhouse, the Seventh Circuit held
that the employer could not require female bank tellers to wear uniforms while allowing
male tellers to wear ordinary business attire. Id. The court first noted that the dress code
was discriminatory in terms of compensation, as women were required to purchase and dry
clean their own uniforms. Id. at 1030. Responding to the employer's stated justification
that the policy reduced "dress competition" and variable fashions among women, the court
asserted that the belief that women were unable to dress as professionally as men was not
only an inadequate reason to preclude liability, but also a "'demeaning ... stereotypical
assumption[] ... anathema to the maturing state of Title VII analysis."' Id. at 1033 (citing
In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (7th
Cir. 1978)).
137. O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266
(S.D. Ohio 1987). O'Donnell held that a smock requirement for women with only an
equivalent business attire requirement for men constituted a violation of Title VII. Id.
Although the smocks were provided to female employees at no cost, the court nevertheless
concluded that the unequal burdens test had been satisfied:
We believe the cornerstone of the Talman decision is that it is demeaning for one sex
to wear a uniform when members of the other sex holding the same positions are al-
lowed to wear professional business attire .... [W]e find that the smock rule creates
disadvantages to the conditions of employment of female sales clerks ....
Id. at 264, 266; see also Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co., 807 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1987).
Sondra Tamimi was a desk clerk who brought suit against the Howard Johnson Company
following her termination for failure to comply with a mandatory makeup requirement.
Id. at 1550-52. Management implemented the requirement only when Tamami became
pregnant and management began to express concern about her resulting pale complexion
and acne. Id. at 1551. Declining to apply an unequal burdens test altogether given the
"unusual" nature of the case, the court concluded that Tamimi was impermissibly termi-
nated because of management's aversion to her pregnancy (a protected sex characteristic
under Title VII), not her appearance. Id. at 1554.
138. See infra notes 139-62 and accompanying text.
139. 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
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and large-build maximums for men.' 4° In striking down the policy, the
court relied solely on the fact that the policy was facially disproportion-
ate, 4 expressly declining to comment on whether the application of a
different weight standard for women in itself was discriminatory. A
year later in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. , ' the Ninth
Circuit was again careful to exclude employer-imposed appearance and
grooming standards from its consideration when applying Price Water-
house to the same-sex sexual harassment claim of an effeminate homo-
sexual employee.1"
The Ninth Circuit's reluctance to apply Title VII to appearance and
grooming standards culminated in Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. 45
140. Id. at 854.
141. See id. at 855. But see Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 439 n.24, 454-57
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that facially neutral weight and height requirements, uniform
maintenance allowances, and no-eyeglass rules are violations of Title VII where they "op-
erate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices" (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971))).
142. Frank, 216 F.3d at 855.
143. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
144. Id. at 875 n.7 ("[O]ur decision does not imply that there is any violation of Title
VII occasioned by reasonable regulations that require male and female employees to con-
form to different dress and grooming standards."). Nichols involved a male waiter who
alleged sexual harassment after being told he carried his tray "like a woman"; was berated
for not having sexual intercourse with a female co-worker; and was referred to in the fe-
male person by male co-workers. Id. at 874. The court concluded that the harassment was
indeed "because of sex" pursuant to Price Waterhouse's definition of sex stereotyping. Id.
at 875. In doing so, it was forced to overrule its previous holding in DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979), that appearance-based sex stereotypes related to
sexual orientation were entirely outside the scope of Title VII. Id.
145. 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002), affd 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), affid on
reh'g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006); see Cruz, supra note 23, at 242 (deeming Jes-
persen a "hero" among casino workers); Jon Christensen, Rouge Rogue, MOTHER JONES,
Mar./Apr. 2001, available at http://www.mothejones.com/news/hellraiser/2001/03/hell
raiser.html (deeming Jespersen a "hellraiser"). Jespersen has become something of a
poster child for appearance discrimination, particularly within the gaming industry. See
Deidre Pike, Sex or Service: Casino Appearance Policies Are Stricter than Those at the
Bunny Ranch, RENO NEWS & REV., Feb. 15, 2001, available at http://www.news
review.com/issues/reno/ 2001-02-15/news.asp. Her case has received substantial media
attention, and her story has been featured in People, Time, and on the BBC. Id. Encour-
aged by the negative public response to "Personal Best," the Alliance for Workers' Rights,
the American Civil Liberties Union, the AFL-CIO, and the Nevada Women's Lobby have
upped their fight against casino appearance policies. Id. In 2001, the Alliance for Work-
ers' Rights, with the public support of Jespersen, launched the "Kiss My Foot" campaign,
targeting casino policies that require cocktail waitresses to wear high heels for excruciating
eight to ten hour shifts. Id. However, Nevadans' attempts at lobbying for legislative pro-
tections for casino workers have been largely unsuccessful. For example, a 2001 bill that
would have prevented discrimination against employees unable to comply with mandatory
dress requirements for medical reasons failed to pass in the Nevada Senate following sub-
stantial lobbying efforts by the Nevada Resort Association. See S.B. 23, 71st Leg. (Nev.
2001); Provisions Governing Discrimination Against Employees Who Have Certain Medical
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In her suit, Jespersen alleged that Harrah's unlawfully fired her for refus-
ing to conform to a sex stereotype (namely, wearing makeup) pursuant to
Price Waterhouse.'46 The United States District Court for the District of
Nevada relied on Baker and Frank in holding that sex-differentiated ap-
pearance and grooming standards were "expressly excepted ... from the
confines of the Price Waterhouse rule., 147 The court went on to apply its
version of the unequal burdens test: "Women must wear makeup. Men
cannot ... '[I]n modern society, both men and women wear makeup
.... ' Thus, prohibiting men from wearing makeup may be just as objec-
tionable to some men as forcing women to wear makeup .... Rather
than looking to the actual burdens imposed by the policy, the court sim-
ply equated the policy's negative prohibitions with its positive require-
ments, and concluded that Jespersen was in no worse a position than her
hypothetical, makeup-wearing male counterparts.' 49
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's analysis.'50
Over a strong dissent,' the majority affirmed that Jespersen was not en-
titled to introduce Price Waterhouse evidence.' The court found Frank's
version of the unequal burdens test controlling,'53 noting that Price
Waterhouse did not address the issue of appearance and grooming stan-
dards.'4 In response to Jespersen's alternative argument that the district
court improperly ignored the time and cost burdens that makeup and hair
Conditions: Hearing on S.B. 23 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce and Labor, 71st Leg.
(Nev. 2001), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/7lstlminutes/senate/cl/final39.html.
146. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citation omitted).
149. Id.
150. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen 1), 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th
Cir. 2004), affd on reh'g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
151. Id. at 1083-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Judge Thomas averred that "Jespersen has
articulated a classic case of Price Waterhouse discrimination and has tendered sufficient
undisputed, material facts to avoid summary judgment." Id. at 1084. Specifically, Judge
Thomas observed that Jespersen was required to conform to a clear stereotype that had no
relationship to bartending, noting that "Title VII does not make exceptions for particular
industries." Id. at 1085-86. Even assuming arguendo that the district court's unequal bur-
dens test was correct, Judge Thomas argued that the "Personal Best" onus was on its face
more stringent for females than for males, and that Jespersen had raised a clear issue of
material fact as to whether it imposed unequal burdens, making summary judgment im-
proper. Id. at 1086.
152. Id. at 1083 (majority opinion) ("[A]lthough we have applied the reasoning of Price
Waterhouse to sexual harassment cases, we have not done so in the context of appearance
and grooming standards cases, and we decline to do so here.").
153. Id.; see also Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) (ap-
plying a strictly facial version of the unequal burdens test).
154. Jespersen I, 392 F.3d at 1082.
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requirements have on women, the court countered that she had failed to
provide specific evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment.'
Jespersen petitioned for, and was granted, en banc rehearing before the
Ninth Circuit.16  On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment for Harrah's in a seven-to-four decision.'57 Although Chief
Judge Schroeder's majority opinion rejected the court's previous refusal
to apply Price Waterhouse to appearance and grooming standards, leav-
ing the door open for future sex stereotyping claims,' 6 it found that Jes-
persen had not established that the makeup requirement in question was
discriminatory.159 Specifically, it held that "requirements must be viewed
in the context of the overall policy," and that under this standard, Jesper-
sen failed to establish she was required to "conform to a stereotypical
image that would objectively impede her ability to perform her job re-
quirements as a bartender. ' 6 The court also rejected Jespersen's un-
equal burdens argument, refusing to take judicial notice of the cost and
time required to comply with makeup requirements. 6' Two judges dis-
sented on both sex stereotyping and unequal burdens grounds.62
155. Id. at 1081. The court also noted the high level of discretion afforded to courts
when applying the unequal burdens test: "[The unequal burdens test] is not an exact sci-
ence yielding results with mathematical certainty.... [A]ny 'burden' to be measured under
the 'unequal burdens' test is only that burden which is imposed beyond the requirements
of generally accepted good grooming standards." Id. at 1081 n.4.
156. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005).
157. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen 11), 444 F.3d 1104, 1106, 1113 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc).
158. See id. at 1113 ("We emphasize that we do not preclude, as a matter of law, a
claim of sex-stereotyping on the basis of dress or appearance codes. Others may well be
filed, and any bases for such claims refined as law in this area evolves.").
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1112-13.
161. Id. at 1110-11 (citing FED. R. EVID. 201; FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). For criticisms of
the court's refusal to acknowledge the time and monetary costs of "Personal Best" within a
traditional unequal burdens framework, see id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("You
don't need an expert witness to figure out that [makeup doesn't] grow on trees.... Even
those of us who don't wear makeup know how long it can take from the hundreds of hours
we've spent over the years frantically tapping our toes and pointing to our wrists."); Post-
ing of Paula Branter to Workplace Fairness Blog: Today's Workplace,
http://www.workplacefairness.org/2005-01_ 01pblog-archive.php (Jan. 3, 2005) ("Have
these judges never lived with or shared a bathroom with a woman? [The absurdity of the
equal burdens argument] seems like an issue that even Justice David Souter, the U.S. Su-
preme Court's perennial bachelor, could understand."). An informal cost survey of low-
end stockings, hair products, and makeup reveals that Harrah's female bartenders were
paying hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars more annually than their male peers to look
their "Personal Best." See id.
162. See Jespersen II, 444 F.3d at 1113-17 (Pregerson, J., dissenting); id. at 1117-18
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Pregerson argued that little evidence was needed to con-
clude that the "Personal Best" program imposed sex stereotypes on female employees
given the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse. Id. at 1114-15 (Pregerson, J.,
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Even while Jespersen I remained under review, courts began to apply
its lax version of the unequal burdens test to cases that involved individu-
alized employer preferences rather than company-wide standards.'6
Similarly, Jespersen II will likely preclude future plaintiffs from challeng-
ing the vast majority of stereotypical appearance and grooming codes, as
well as abrogate a much broader line of cases involving divergent appear-
ances and mannerisms.164
III. UNDERSTANDING APPEARANCE AND GROOMING STANDARDS AS
SEX DISCRIMINATION: A DEONTOLOGICAL APPROACH
A. Recognizing the Need to Impose Reasonable Standards and Preventing
a Slippery Slope Effect
Many academics, practitioners, and civil rights advocacy groups are
troubled by a teleological, business-oriented approach to appearance and
grooming standards.65 Jennifer Pizer, an attorney with the Lambda Le-
dissenting). Judge Pregerson also objected to the notion that appearance and grooming
standards must be viewed in light of the overall policy, noting that "the majority's ap-
proach would permit otherwise impermissible gender stereotypes to be neutralized by the
presence of a stereotype or burden that affects people of the opposite gender, or by some
separate non-discriminatory requirement that applies to both men and women." Id. at
1116. In contrast, Judge Kozinski agreed with the majority that the makeup requirement
should be viewed in light of the entire policy, but nevertheless found that both the applica-
tion and continued wearing of makeup caused "Personal Best" to be more burdensome for
women than men in violation of Title VII. Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
163. See, e.g., Sturchio v. Ridge, No. CV-03-0025-RHW, 2005 WL 1502899, at *15-16
(E.D. Wash. June 23, 2005) (citing Jespersen I and concluding that the employer could
order a male employee who had chosen to function in society as a woman not to wear a
dress because the request did not constitute an unequal burden, despite the fact that
women in the administrative office were permitted to wear dresses, the office had a long
history of harassment against the plaintiff, and co-workers had recently complained to
management about the plaintiff's effeminate behavior).
164. Compare Sturchio, 2005 WL 1502899, at *16 (applying Jespersen I to deny a Title
VII claim), with Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 734-35, 738 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 624 (2005) (finding that a male employee with a French manicure, arched
eyebrows, and makeup established a Price Waterhouse claim after being demoted for his
lack of "command presence" and "grooming deficiencies"), Smith v. City of Salem, 378
F.3d 566, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that a male employee with Gender Identity Dis-
order established a Price Waterhouse claim based on his employer's aversion to his effemi-
nate appearance and holding that "employers who discriminate against men because they.
. wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are... engaging in sex discrimi-
nation, because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex"), and Rosa v.
Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213,215-16 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Price Waterhouse
and finding that refusing to give a loan application to a transsexual based on his effeminate
appearance could be a violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which makes it
unlawful for creditors to discriminate against credit applicants "'on the basis of... sex"').
165. See Cruz, supra note 23, at 258-59; Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Holds that Women
Can Be Required to Wear Makeup as a Condition of Employment, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2429, 2436 (2005) [hereinafter Recent Case]; Sherry F. Colb, Makeup Requirements for
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gal Defense and Education Fund and counsel for Jespersen, argued that
the Ninth Circuit panel presumptively assumed that applying Price
Waterhouse to appearance-based impositions would destroy employers'
ability to enact employee standards and would mire society in frivolous
lawsuits by "eccentric" employees.166 Pizer pointed out, however, that
Jespersen was not objecting to "neutral, professional standards" or "uni-
forms identifying an employee with his or her employer," but rather the
specific application of a "demeaning stereotype."' 67 Commentators note
that a more BFOQ-like inquiry into what constitutes an objectively rea-
sonable dress and grooming standard,' 68 in addition to health, safety, and
dress ordinances regulating workplace appearance, 69 would provide ade-
quate protections for employers.
Female Employees Violate Anti-Discrimination Law: Why a Federal Appeals Court Erred
in Ruling to the Contrary, WRIT: FINDLAW'S LEGAL COMMENTARY, Jan. 11, 2005,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20050111.html. The American Civil Liberties Union,
Northwest Women's Law Center, Gender PAC, National Employment Lawyers Associa-
tion, Alliance for Workers' Rights, Legal Aid Society, National Center for Lesbian Rights,
Transgender Law Center, and Hawaii Civil Rights Commission all filed amici curiae briefs
in support of Jespersen. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 27
(posting the briefs).
166. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 8-10, Jespersen 11, 444 F.3d 1114 (No. 03-15045).
Amici curiae briefs in support of Harrah's set forth a colorful parade of horribles regarding
Title VII's prospective application to appearance and grooming codes, including claims by
"employees who sport jewelry like Mr. T, wear makeup like Gene Simmons of Kiss, dress
like Dennis Rodman, have hair like Fabio or beards like a member of ZZ Top." Brief of
Council for Employment Law Equity et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-
Appellee at 23, Jespersen 11, 444 F.3d 1114 (No. 03-15045).
167. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 166, at 8-9.
168. See Recent Case, supra note 165, at 2434-35 (noting that the dicta in Nichols refers
to reasonable appearance and grooming standards, and should not apply to clearly unrea-
sonable standards, such as those that interfere with personal job performance). Jespersen I
and Jespersen II appeared to narrowly define objectively unreasonable policies as only
those that directly cause sexual harassment or interfere with the job performance of an
entire class of employees. See Jespersen H, 444 F.3d at 1112-13 (noting that Jespersen
found the makeup requirement "personally offensive" and that "[t]his is not a case where
the dress or appearance requirement is intended to be sexually provocative . . . . [n]or is
this a case of sexual harassment"); Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen 1), 392
F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2004), affd on reh'g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006)
(limiting the application of Price Waterhouse to sexual harassment cases and pointing out
that Jespersen was never sexually harassed). In fact, the Jespersen I and Jespersen II defi-
nitions of reasonableness appear even broader than the definitions that rationalized the
exclusion of appearance and grooming standards in the early hair length cases. See Wil-
lingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (defining reasonable
grooming standards as those "in accordance with generally accepted community standards
of dress and appearance"); Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (defining reasonable grooming regulations as those that take into account "basic
differences in male and female physiques and common differences in customary dress").
169. See Jespersen II, 444 F.3d at 1118 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (distinguishing "Per-
sonal Best" from policies that reflect the anatomical differences between the sexes, such as
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Jespersen II's objective standard gives employers the ability to impose
reasonable gender-specific agpearance and grooming standards without
fear of Title VII challenges.' However, in its fervor to avoid interfering
with employers' business judgments, the Ninth Circuit's approach ap-
pears to have unnecessarily excluded an entire class of clearly unreason-
171
able standards from Title VII's coverage.
B. Looking to the Literal and Interpretive Meaning of Title VII
1. Title VII's Prohibition Against Adverse Employment Actions "Be-
cause of... Sex"
Courts and commentators make the common sense observation that
appearance standards such as mandatory makeup for women are per se
imposed "because of... sex.' ' 72 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court
read the words "because of" to mean that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions, regardless of whether or not there is direct causa-
tion. 73 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit recently applied a "but for" test in
concluding that requiring women to wear makeup would constitute a
Title VII violation.1 4 But for an employee's female status, an employer
would not fire her for refusing to wear makeup, making gender a relevant
factor in the termination.'75
Professor David Cruz also applies a "straightforward interpretation" of
Title VII to reveal the "baroque and linguistically implausible interpreta-
tions of what it is to 'discriminate"' set forth in the unequal burdens test
and cases like Jespersen:
indecent exposure laws); Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 166, at 8-9 (observing that
employers may require employees to comply with local ordinances).
170. See Jespersen 11, 444 F.3d at 1112; see also Bartlett, supra note 123, at 2553-54
(discussing the value of formal dress and appearance codes to employers).
171. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (comparing an intuitive definition of
reasonableness with the Ninth Circuit's determination that appearance and grooming
standards are presumed reasonable as long as they do not elicit sexual harassment of em-
ployees and do not objectively impede a class of employees' ability to perform their jobs).
172. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004); Baron, supra note 15,
at 370; Cruz, supra note 23, at 244-45; Recent Case, supra note 165, at 2435.
173. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989). In fact, EEOC
regulations categorize certain gender-differentiated dress codes as direct evidence of sex
discrimination. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Revised En-
forcement Guidance on Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory (July 14,
1992), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/disparat.html (listing a dress code requiring women
to wear miniskirts as an example of direct evidence of sex discrimination).
174. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 574 ("After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discrimi-
nates against women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engag-
ing in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's
sex.").
175. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
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Darlene Jespersen was fired for refusing to wear the make-up
regimen prescribed for women.... Yet male bartenders were not
subject to this term or condition. Accordingly, this is discrimina-
tion prohibited by Title VII (discrimination on the basis of sex in
a term or condition of employment) that is never authorized by
the BFOQ provision [pursuant to the plain language of the
BFOQ provision, which only addresses decisions to "hire and
employ"]. 6
Both the Sixth Circuit and Professor Cruz's readings of Title VII empha-
size that the only conceivable reason an employer imposes makeup on
employees is because they are female.
2. The "Plus-Sex" Business Distinction
Frank, Nichols, Jespersen I, and Jespersen II reflect understandable
concern about avoiding a slippery slope of Title VII challenges to every
118
uniform in the country. However, there are recognizable differences in
what gender-differentiated appearance or grooming standards set out to
achieve, depending on whether a business is purely for sexual titillation,
"plus-sex," or strictly goods and services oriented. 9 Pursuant to the pri-
mary purpose doctrine, the BFOQ exception permits gender specificity
when job tasks are primarily related to sex.8 This is a nuanced, but navi-
gable, line of precedent developed through forty years of BFOQ analy-
181
sis.
Jespersen II precluded such a distinction. 82 Jespersen II essentially held
that as long as employers impose a facially equal burden on men and en-
sure the standard would not objectively impede job performance, they
are free to impose on women any demeaning appearance stereotype they
wish,'83 regardless of its relevance to the job or the actual social, emo-
176. Cruz, supra note 23, at 244-47 (citation omitted).
177. See Kathy Peiss, Making Faces: The Cosmetics Industry and the Cultural Construc-
tion of Gender, 1890-1930, reprinted in UNEQUAL SISTERS: A MULTICULTURAL READER
IN U.S. WOMEN'S HISTORY 372, 372 (Vicki L. Ruiz & Ellen Carol DuBois eds., 2d ed.
1994) (noting that cosmetics are enmeshed with women's work, athletics, leisure, sexuality,
and consumption).
178. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen I1), 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc); Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen 1), 392 F.3d 1076,
1082-83 (9th Cir. 2004), affd on reh'g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006); Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001); Frank v. United Airlines,
Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000); cf Bartlett, supra note 123, at 2553-55 (discussing
the extent to which dress and appearance standards are utilized to achieve business goals).
179. See Yuracko, supra note 45, at 156-59 (tracing the "continuum" of business goals
involved in BFOQ defenses).
180. See supra Part I.A.
181. See supra Part I.A.
182. See Cruz, supra note 23, at 244-45.
183. See Jespersen II, 444 F.3d at 1116 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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tional, or psychological harm it may cause.'4 Harrah's is thus permitted
to function as a "plus-sex" business without ever having to raise a BFOQ
defense or legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment prac-
tices.
18 1
3. Price Waterhouse's Application to Institutionalized Stereotypes
Most importantly, the evidence presented by Jespersen is precisely the
kind the Supreme Court used in its original Price Waterhouse decision: an
employee's failure to act feminine in an environment where femininity is
detrimental to job performance.'86 Price Waterhouse confirmed that the
imposition of sex stereotypes should be considered as evidence that an
adverse employment action is based on sex. 8 7 The Ninth Circuit distin-
guished Jespersen from Price Waterhouse because Jespersen involved a
"subjective reaction" to an "overall policy" that applied to both men and
women.'8 However, this rationale ignores the central holding of Price
Waterhouse: gender must be irrelevant to an employment decision unless
it falls under the BFOQ exception.1 89 The Price Waterhouse Court explic-
itly noted that "[b]y focusing on Hopkins' specific proof ... we do not
suggest a limitation on the possible ways of proving that stereotyping
played a motivating role in an employment decision, and we refrain from
deciding here which specific facts, 'standing alone,' would or would not
establish a plaintiff's case."' 9
The "coup de grace" in Hopkins' case, proving to the Court that Hop-
kins' sex motivated Price Waterhouse rather than her interpersonal skills,
was the fact that she was told her partnership chances would increase if
she softened her physical appearance.'9' Similarly in Jespersen, Harrah's
184. See id. at 1117-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Cruz, supra note 23, at 242. But see
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("[T]he language of Title VII is not
limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment' evinces a congressional intent "'to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women"' in employment.") (citations omitted).
185. See Recent Case, supra note 165, at 2436 (arguing that Jespersen I inadvertently
disadvantaged women in "plus-sex" service industries because they predominately experi-
ence pressure to look sexually alluring, whereas women in white collar professions pre-
dominantly experience pressure to act feminine).
186. See id. at 2435 (comparing the catch-22 imposed by the employer in Price Water-
house to the one imposed in Jespersen); Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as "Catch
22": Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 299, 314-16 (2005) (noting that "one could easily view Jespersen as the [post-Price
Waterhouse] case raising a sex-stereotyping claim most similar to the case Ann Hopkins
raised.., yet, Jespersen lost where Hopkins prevailed").
187. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
188. See Jespersen 11, 444 F.3d at 1111-13.
189. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241-42.
190. Id. at 251-52.
191. See id. at 235.
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demanded that Jespersen (along with all other female beverage servers)
soften her physical appearance as a condition of employment.'9 Yet, the
Ninth Circuit found no evidence that Harrah's terminated Jespersen be-
cause of her sex."' Although the holding in Price Waterhouse is framed
in terms of acting feminine rather than looking feminine, 94 nothing in its
language suggests that institutionalizing a sex stereotype in an overall
policy or failing to label it as "feminine" precludes courts from reading it
.... 195
as evidence of sex discrimination. To the contrary, the Court appeared
to group appearance within a broader category of stereotypes related to
acting feminine. 96
IV. ESTABLISHING A STANDARD OF PROOF
A. An Additional Consideration: Distinguishing Social and Business
Norms from Sex Stereotypes
Jespersen II permits plaintiffs to submit Price Waterhouse evidence in
Title VII appearance and grooming cases.197 However, Jespersen II also
brings to light the additional hurdle of proving that the requirement is a
sex stereotype.' 98 This Comment has thus far operated under the assump-
tion that teased hair, stockings, high heels, and makeup inherently are
related to sex-oriented norms, whereas short hair, trimmed nails, and a
clean face inherently are related to grooming-oriented norms. However,
McDonnell Douglas and Jespersen II require plaintiffs to prove this as-
sumption.' 99
192. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen 1), 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th
Cir. 2004), affd on reh'g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
193. See Jespersen 11, 444 F.3d at 1112 (concluding that Jespersen failed to present
evidence that "Personal Best" sex stereotyped female employees or impeded their job
performances); Jespersen I, 392 F.3d at 1083 (declining to apply Price Waterhouse to ap-
pearance and grooming standard cases altogether).
194. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
195. See Jespersen 11, 444 F.3d at 1115 (Pregerson, J., dissenting); Gregory J. Kamer et
al., Lipstick and Lawsuits: Can Sexual Stereotyping Claims Successfully Combat "Appear-
ance Discrimination?", EMP. L. NEWSL. (Int'l Ass'n of Def. Counsel, Chi., I11.), Jul. 2005, at
1, 5. Ironically, the Jespersen I majority itself acknowledged that Price Waterhouse "did
not address the specific question of whether an employer can impose sex-differentiated
appearance and grooming standards on its male and female employees." Jespersen 1, 392
F.3d at 1082 (emphasis added).
196. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251-52; see also Jespersen 11, 444 F.3d at 1115
(Pregerson, J., dissenting); Recent Case, supra note 165, at 2435.
197. Jespersen II, 444 F.3d at 1113.
198. See Appellee's Answering Brief at 3, 8, Jespersen 11, 444 F.3d 1104 (No. 03-15045)
(arguing that the sex-differentiated appearance standards at issue were "sex-neutral" and
that the "purported stigma" of wearing makeup is no different from maintaining "short
hair and a clean-shaven appearance").
199. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (requiring that
plaintiffs provide indicia of discrimination on the basis of a protected class to establish a
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In Price Waterhouse, a partner told Hopkins, in no uncertain terms, to
"dress more femininely."' 20 0 It was easy for the Court to conclude that sex• • 201
played a role in her evaluation. Unfortunately, Harrah's never asked
Jespersen to dress or act more femininely in so many words.2°4 Instead, it
imposed a department-wide appearance policy, asserting an interest in
creating a "brand standard of excellence."
Unlike immutable status, beauty and sexuality are artificial cultural
204constructs. Moreover, they are constantly evolving and inherently sub-
jective.2 5 While some find wearing stockings, high heels, and makeup to
206
work every day a simple matter of professionalism, others find them
more appropriate as "pornographic accessories." 20 7 Further complicating
matters, the women's liberation movement and the sexual revolution of
the 1970s forged a new brand of feminism-one that flaunts difference
and, consequently, embraces many stereotypical notions of femininity."
Legal scholars have long struggled to distinguish workplace appearance
and grooming standards that truly are discriminatory from those that
merely reflect longstanding cultural differences between the sexes.2°4
prima facie Title VII case); Jespersen II, 444 F.3d at 1108 (finding that Jespersen's "subjec-
tive reaction" was not "evidence to suggest Harrah's motivation was to stereotype the
women bartenders").
200. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
201. See id.
202. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen 1), 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th
Cir. 2004), affd on reh'g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
203. Id.; Appellee's Answering Brief, supra note 198, at 2 (characterizing "Personal
Best" as part of an "initiative to raise the total service performance of the ... beverage
team," alongside changes to uniforms, performance ratings, and hiring criteria).
204. See WOLF, supra note 9, at 12-13; Bartlett, supra note 123, at 2548.
205. See WOLF, supra note 9, at 12-13.
206. See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 23, at 241 (discussing how makeup may actually im-
prove some women's job performance by making them feel "armored, less vulnerable to
the world") (quotations omitted).
207. See, e.g., WOLF, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing how pornography utilizes stock-
ings, high heels, makeup, and jewelry).
208. See generally LEVY, supra note 10, at 3-4; Dowd, supra note 42, at 55. "Transcen-
dental feminism" has firmly established itself in the workplace. For example, Carrie Ger-
lach, a Sony Pictures executive, wrote in 2001:
My best mentors and teachers have always been men. Why? Because I have great
legs, great tits, and a huge smile.... Do you think those male mentors wanted me tell-
ing them how to better their careers, marketing departments, increase demographics?
Hell no. They wanted to play in my secret garden. But I applied the Chanel war
paint, pried open the door with Gucci heels, worked, struggled and climbed the lad-
der.... And I did it all in a short Prada suit.
LEVY, supra note 10, at 102.
209. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Dis-
crimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 33-34 (1987); Bartlett, supra note 123, at 2548.
Professor MacKinnon's long-running criticism of the so-called "difference approach" to
sex equality provides a particularly useful foundation. See MACKINNON, supra, at 34.
Professor MacKinnon defines the philosophy of difference as the belief that "sex is a dif-
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Courts have refused to make judgments in this regard. ° Virtually all
dress conventions are rooted in some form of gender construction," and
this presents an evidentiary nightmare to an already overburdened judi-
ciary.2
It is beyond the capacity of courts to determine whether an employer's
ultimate goal is a wholesome, polished workforce or turning all its female
employees into sex objects. 3 Moreover, the widely accepted theory of
"unconscious bias" posits that most discrimination is largely cognitive.1
Employers may be genuinely unaware that they are reinforcing demean-
ing stereotypes.215 However, many commentators stress that the inunda-
tion of sex stereotypes in society is an insufficient justification for their
216judicial reinforcement. Specifically, many legal theorists argue that the
ference, a division, a distinction, beneath which lies a stratum of human commonality,
sameness." Id. at 33. Although most difference advocates admit it is "patronizing," they
believe it is "necessary to avoid absurdity [and] exists to value ... women for what [they]
are ... as women ... under existing conditions." Id. However, Professor MacKinnon
argues that the difference approach is really just a means of measuring women by the male
standard. Id. at 34. In contrast, the "dominance approach" views sex discrimination as a
power struggle. Id. at 40. Because the dominance approach looks at the perceived differ-
ences between the sexes as a result of subordination rather than as projections from the
male-oriented status quo, Professor MacKinnon concludes that it is a better means of
legally assessing what is discriminatory against women. Id. at 43. Thus, many feminist
legal scholars argue that gender-differentiated professional dress is discriminatory because
it centers on masculine norms and is used to reinforce patriarchies and sexist attitudes. See
NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 102 (1998); Nadine
Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Dis-
crimination, 21 B.C. L. REv. 345, 387 (1980). This leaves women to feminize at their own
risk. See, e.g., Meena Thiruvengadam, Short Skirts and Power Don't Mix: Study Reveals
Bias that Sexy Women Aren't Smar -Or Fit to Manage, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Jan. 9, 2006, at D2.
210. See LEVIT, supra note 209, at 99-102 (discussing how courts give "legal imprima-
tur" to normative dress standards without questioning their relation to gender and identity
formation); Klare, supra note 126, at 1401 (observing that "judges create a peculiar disso-
nance by trivializing appearance claims while at the same time asserting the need for the
authorities to possess vast powers to enforce conventional attitudes and prejudices").
211. See Bartlett, supra note 123, at 2570.
212. See, e.g., supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 40.
214. See Lee, supra note 41, at 482-84. Specifically, social psychologists find that
stereotypes are often unrelated to conscious intent. Id. at 483. Once individuals are ex-
posed to a stereotype, it distorts subsequent "raw" incoming information and forms im-
pressions of stereotypical behavior that never happened, creating a cycle of legitimatiza-
tion. Id. at 484. The good news is that studies show unconscious bias can be controlled
with "more effortful impression processes." Id. at 485 (quotations omitted).
215. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
216. See LEVIT, supra note 209, at 100-02; WOLF, supra note 9, at 48-49; Bartlett, supra
note 123, at 2570; Klare, supra note 126, at 1419-20.
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underlying implications of policies like "Personal Best" overshadow their
aesthetically pleasing, normative nature.217
B. Adding Objectivity to a "Subjective Reaction"
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse, courts
appear to have an obligation under Title VII to look past the facial bur-
dens imposed by appearance and grooming standards and make indi-
vidualized determinations as to whether they are "because of... sex." '218
A sociologically informed, contextual inquiry would prove useful for
courts and attorneys in evenhandedly determining whether a particular
policy qualifies as Price Waterhouse evidence.219
First, courts should look to the sociological implications of a particular
gender-specific appearance and grooming standard.220 Second, courts
should recognize that although virtually all appearance norms are rooted
in cultural constructions of gender, they differ in kind and degree, par-
ticularly when viewed in context.21 Cultural meaning or community
norms may not provide accurate bases for defining sex stereotyping."'
However, Dean Katharine Bartlett's proposal to examine whether a par-
ticular standard as applied is "interwoven with [women's] historically
217. See, e.g., WOLF, supra note 9, at 45-46 ("Emulating the male uniform is tough on
women. Their urge to make traditionally masculine space less gray, sexless, and witless is
an appealing wish. But their contribution did not relax the rules. Men failed to respond
with whimsy, costume, or color of their own. The consequence of men wearing uniforms
where women do not has simply meant that women take on the full penalties as well as the
pleasures of physical charm in the workplace, and can legally be punished or promoted...
accordingly.").
218. See supra Part III.B.3.
219. See infra Part IV.B.
220. See Bartlett, supra note 123, at 2569-70.
221. See id. at 2570-72.
222. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (observing that
"mutually reinforcing stereotypes create[] a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination" that
fosters employers' ability to impose such stereotypes and that courts often are unable to
detect); Bartlett, supra note 123, at 2560 (discussing how the formal tests used in appear-
ance and grooming cases are built upon community norms and therefore prove ineffective
for plaintiffs who are challenging such norms); Klare, supra note 126, at 1419-20 (describ-
ing the "community norm" standard of discrimination as "laughable," arguing that civil
rights legislation that works from established social norms is clearly "hollow[]").
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inferior status" is a useful inquiry in the spirit of Title VII'2 3 In this vein,
expert witnesses are playing increasingly vital roles in plaintiffs' cases.1
24
An evidentiary model that takes into account sociological, fact-specific
considerations would prevent sweeping precedent leading to the com-
plete dissolution of all sex-differentiated appearance and grooming stan-
dards.22 A careful analysis of the "Personal Best" program proves in-
structive.
223. See Bartlett, supra note 123, at 2570 ("Identifying ... damaging links [between
appearance conventions and sex stereotypes] cannot be done with scientific certainty, of
course, but nonetheless is legally required. . .. Courts should find all such conventions
discriminatory 'on the basis of sex,' unless narrowly tailored to sex differences in ways that
do not perpetuate [women's] historically inferior status."); see also Willingham v. Macon
Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975) (reasoning that hair length regula-
tions are not within the scope of Title VII because they do not pose "distinct employment
disadvantages" to men and are not used to "elevate" women).
224. See Lee, supra note 41, at 497-503; see, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 235, 255-56 (1989) (giving credence to social psychologist Dr. Susan Fiske's testimony
that sex stereotyping played a role in Price Waterhouse's decision over Price Waterhouse's
objections regarding the speculative nature of her academic analysis). Gregory Sarno
provides a hypothetical example of what such testimony may entail, addressing a gender-
differentiated dress and appearance code that reflects those found in Carroll, Guardian
Capital, and Jespersen:
Q. How, then, professor, does [the] dehumanizing effect of subliminally seductive ad-
vertising tie in with the dress and grooming code adhered to by the defendant in the
present case?
A. The appearance code in this case clearly perpetuates a male chauvinistic image of
women as dumb sex objects. For one thing, the waitresses are required to wear com-
pany-provided uniforms, whereas waiters need only select a choice of attire within a
range, however limited, of acceptable alternatives; this differential treatment implies
that men, but not women, are capable of choosing appropriate work clothing.
Q. Are there any other reasons for your conclusion, professor?
A. Yes. Additionally, the code's language in and of itself has the effect of reinforcing
this negative stereotype of women. Notice how, in addressing the issue of waiters' at-
tire, the code is relatively brief. In sharp contrast, the requirements for waitresses are
extremely detailed and are patronizingly phrased .... Thirdly, and most obviously,
the waitress' uniforms are overtly sexually provocative. The garter is nothing other
than a sex symbol .... Moreover, the short skirt bares the thighs and, at times, the
derriere; and the partially unbuttoned blouse exposes the breasts-body parts which,
in America, have virtually achieved the status of a sexual fetish....
Q. Do you have an opinion concerning the likely effects on male-female relationships
of the defendant's waitressing outfit?
A. Most assuredly, I do.
Q. What is your opinion, then, about the uniform's probable effects on male-female
relationships?
A. Under the restaurant's dress and grooming code, the waitress is dehumanized...
and, as long as she wishes to retain her employment, she is helpless to prevent [the
male observer's] fantasies.
Sarno, supra note 121, at 161-63.
225. See infra notes 226-36 and accompanying text.
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Under the above Price Waterhouse model, a simple hair or stockings
mandate in itself is unlikely to be interpreted as a sex stereotype. 26 The
hair length cases decided over thirty years ago used a similar sociological
test in concluding that hair style is unrelated to gender both in terms of
power dynamics and employment opportunities. 27 Under this reasoning,
a standard that requires women to neatly style or comb their hair would
not serve as Price Waterhouse evidence.2 2 However, elaborate require-
ments such as the one found in "Personal Best" would be more suscepti-
ble to the Price Waterhouse rule.' 29 According to one social historian,
"masses of hair arranged in intricate displays" often symbolize women's
sexuality in relation to men.30 As such, hairstyling standards may rein-
force women's inferior status in a limited number of circumstances.2 31
Both men and women have worn non-sexual variations of hosiery
throughout history.7 Stockings serve many functional purposes in the
workplace, including keeping legs protected and warm, ensuring sanita-
tion, enhancing blood circulation, and completing a professional look. 3
However, a standard requiring female employees to wear overtly sexual
hosiery,D4 or otherwise applying a stockings requirement in a manner that
clearly affects the employment opportunities of women, 35 would be plau-
sible evidence of Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping. 6
In contrast to hairstyles and stockings, high heel and makeup require-
ments raise red flags under a sociological, fact-based Price Waterhouse
model. 7  The "erotic-unpractical" high heel is a remnant of the Indus-
trial Revolution, developed as an "ideal of visible idleness" to contrast
226. See infra notes 227-36 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir.
1975) (reasoning that hair length regulations are not within the scope of Title VII because
they "do not pose distinct employment disadvantages" to men and are not used to "ele-
vate" women).
228. See Recent Case, supra note 165, at 2434 (proposing that certain grooming stan-
dards such as hair length simply "incorporate[] a commonplace judgment that men should
not have long hair" and are not sufficiently rooted in harmful sex stereotypes to warrant
Price Waterhouse's application).
229. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
230. Lois W. BANNER, AMERICAN BEAUTY 208-09 (1983). In many cultural tradi-
tions, women hide or crop their hair to indicate sexual purity or monogamy. Id. at 209-10
(noting Catholic, Orthodox Jewish, and Puritan practices). In contrast, "thick, luxuriant"
hair was historically associated with "an increased sensuality." Id. at 208-09.
231. See id.
232. See Kevin Helliker, Kingsize, Not Queen: Some Men Have Taken to Wearing
Pantyhose, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19,2002, at Al.
233. See id.
234. See WOLF, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing stockings as sexual imagery).
235. See supra note 161 (discussing the financial burdens of appearance and grooming
products such as stockings).
236. See supra notes 223, 234-35 and accompanying text.
237. See infra notes 238-46 and accompanying text.
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"employed bourgeois men who needed practical clothing." 28 Today, high
heel requirements have extremely detrimental effects on female employ-
ees' health and their capacity to perform their job tasks39 For example,
in the casino context, women unable to meet the grueling demands of
eight- to ten-hour shifts on their feet have been forced to leave the casi-
nos for lower-paying positions.'4°
As for makeup, the "painted lady" was historically associated with
prostitution and immorality, with red lips, dilated eyes, and flushed
cheeks intended to replicate signs of sexual arousal.4  Cosmetics have
long been commercialized in a way that reflects the inherent aesthetic
and economic differences between men and women.2  Today, notions of
what makes women beautiful and sexually alluring most often involve the
application of cosmetics and other artificial practices.243 According to one
commentator, the "legitimation of the use of cosmetics and their power-
ful hold over American women are a striking example of the dominance
of the drive for femininity.",244 Makeup is "deeply offensive and disem-
powering" to some women. 4 ' As such, makeup requirements place fe-
male employees at a distinct disadvantage in the workplace.
246
Thus, pursuant to a sociological, fact-based evidentiary model, Jesper-
sen would have successfully presented indicia that her employer's policies
238. Marc Linder, Smart Women, Stupid Shoes, and Cynical Employers: The Unlawful-
ness and Adverse Health Consequences of Sexually Discriminatory Workplace Footwear
Requirements for Female Employees, 22 J. CORP. L. 295, 300-03 (1997). Professor Linder
notes how high heels "strikingly" alter women's postures by "forc[ing] the stomach in and
the breast out, drawing in the back, making the pelvis more prominent, straightening the
knees, and making the thighs firmer." Id. at 300.
239. See id. at 299-300, 312-24 (discussing the pervasiveness of unhealthful high heel
requirements in "women-as-servers" occupations).
240. See Kamer & Keller, supra note 9, at 345; Smith, supra note 43.
241. BANNER, supra note 230, at 208; JENNIFER CRAIK, THE FACE OF FASHION:
CULTURAL STUDIES IN FASHION 158 (1994); Peiss, supra note 177, at 373-74.
242. Peiss, supra note 177, at 374-76.
243. See BANNER, supra note 230, at 274.
244. Id. at 275.
245. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen I), 444 F.3d 1104, 1117-18
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Cruz, supra note 23, at 241-42; Reply
Brief of Appellant, supra note 166, at 7-11; Brief of ACLU of Nev. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, Jespersen 11, 444 F.3d 1104 (No. 03-15045).
246. See Cruz, supra note 23, at 241-42. The annual income of a casino beverage
worker averages between $75,000 and $90,000, with approximately $50,000 of that coming
from tips. Smith, supra note 43. Thus, casino appearance policies often present women
unable or unwilling to comply with demeaning sex stereotypes only the options of quitting
or taking a significant pay cut. See Kamer & Keller, supra note 9, at 340-42; Smith, supra
note 43. In contrast, makeup prohibitions for men simply maintain a neutral status quo,
both in terms of sexuality and for purposes of the unequal burdens test. See Recent Case,
supra note 165, at 2434 (positing that many standards for men are not sufficiently rooted in
harmful sex stereotypes to warrant Price Waterhouse's application).
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were motivated by sex.247 Harrah's would have countered that Jesper-
sen's termination was based on her failure to comply with a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory appearance requirement. 8  In response, Jespersen
would have presented proof of pretext,249 including: a review of the bur-
dens placed on male bartenders;20 her excellent performance ratings and
popularity with customers even when she did not wear makeup;25 ' the fact
that the requirement impeded Jespersen's security functions as a bar-
tender;5 2 and evidence of the sociological meaning behind the "Personal
Best" makeup requirement.5
In sum, by using a traditional, fact-specific McDonnell Douglas inter-
play, courts would avoid making prodigious declarations regarding the
role of gender in society. In applying a broad objective impediment
test, judges underestimate their ability to narrowly interpret standards on
a case-by-case basis. 5 As Justice Stewart once observed: "I shall not...
247. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text. Under its unequal burdens frame-
work, the Jespersen I majority simply discounted Jespersen's sociological evidence as "aca-
demic literature" unrelated to the task at hand. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co.
(Jespersen 1), 392 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004), affd on reh'g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th
Cir. 2006). Likewise, the Jespersen II majority found that Jespersen's evidence did not
establish that "the policy was adopted to make women bartenders conform to a com-
monly-accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear." Jespersen H, 444 F.3d
at 1112. However, Jespersen faced the very real dilemma of either complying with a socio-
logically demeaning sex stereotype that interfered with her ability to bartend or being
forced out of her job entirely. See Deposition of Darlene Betty Jespersen, supra note 25,
at 79-80; see also supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text. Following Jespersen's com-
plaint to management regarding her unwillingness to comply with "Personal Best's"
makeup requirement, she was told to apply for a transfer to a non-guest services oriented
position, the majority of which paid significantly less and for which Jespersen was unquali-
fied. Deposition of Darlene Betty Jespersen, supra note 25, at 79-80.
248. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Appel-
lee's Answering Brief, supra note 198, at 2, 8 (arguing that the sex-differentiated appear-
ance standards at issue were "sex-neutral").
249. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
250. See Jespersen 1, 392 F.3d at 1077.
251. See id. (noting how Jespersen was rated by supervisors as "'highly effective' and
praised for making a good impression on guests); Cruz, supra note 23, at 242 (noting that
one Harrah's customer referred to Jespersen's bar as "Darlene's Room" and wrote man-
agement to laud her for cutting him off "tactfully but firmly").
252. See Cruz, supra note 23, at 242; Recent Case, supra note 165, at 2435.
253. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Part IV.B.
255. See supra Part IV.B. Two additional examples of how a sociological, fact-specific
Price Waterhouse rule would apply further illustrate its limits. First, a Harrah's showgirl
who is required to wear heavy stage makeup and sexually suggestive attire would not have
a sex discrimination claim under Title VII. Although her conditions of employment are
clearly predicated on her conformance with sex stereotypes under Price Waterhouse, Har-
rah's would have a BFOQ defense based on the fact that sexual titillation is her primary
job task. See supra Part I.A. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a female attorney
passed over for a position in the corporate offices in favor of another more smartly
dressed, made-up, and coiffed but equally qualified female candidate would also not have
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attempt . . . to define the kind of material I understand to be embraced
[by a] shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intel-
ligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.
256
V. CONCLUSION
Although Title VII purportedly "lifts women out of [the] bind '' 7 cre-
ated by sex stereotypes in the workplace, it rarely reaches one of the most
common catch-22s they face: their appearance. At a time when "[t]he
glossy, overheated thumping of sexuality in our culture is less about con-
. • ,,258
nection than consumption, female employees are being increasingly
objectified at work through uniforms and dress codes. However, deci-
sions like Jespersen I and Jespersen II cement the judicial principle that
appearance and grooming standards are trivial unless tangibly related to
immutable status.59 This reasoning runs contrary to Title VII jurispru-
dence. Courts have the capacity to efficiently and equitably put the teeth
back in Title VII by applying the same considerations to appearance and
grooming standards cases as they do to immutable status Title VII claims.
a Title VII claim. Under the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework, Harrah's would
be able to present evidence that its motivation was rooted in overall appearance, not gen-
der conformity. See supra Part I.B. In contrast, if a no-pants or mandatory makeup policy
for women was in place, a court would be more inclined to find evidence of pretext or a
historically-based discriminatory meaning. See LEVIT, supra note 209, at 100; Bartlett,
supra note 123, at 2571.
256. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (addressing
the "indefinable" meaning of obscenity under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
257. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
258. LEVY, supra note 10, at 31.
259. See Bartlett, supra note 123, at 2580.
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